Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 10:24:36 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: And still France falls On 3-6-96 Dave Lippman wrote: > ...One of the things that was striking about the Third Republic was how >its servants were very hostile to it. Weygand was a monarchist, for >example. Petain, Laval, Baudoin, made no secret of their dislike of the >Republic. They identified it with Bolshevism, Socialism, high taxes, and >Jews. > Of course, part of the hostility came out of the WW1 and the Great >Depression, in which European civilization was faced with the spectacle >of Western democracy being unable to contend with two of the greatest >upheavals in history, that shattered the social structure of what was >still the world's ruling nations. Democracy couldn't end WW1. After it >did, it couldn't solve the Great Depression.... Hostility to the Third Republic had much deeper roots than WW1 or the Depression -- it goes right back to establishment of the Third Republic itself. Monarchist v Republican v Bonapartism (or Caesarism, if you prefer -- the man on the white horse). Bourgeous v Socialist. Traditionalist and clerical v progressive and anti-clerical. Etc. At times, the only thing that seemed to save the Third Republic was that its foes could not agree on what would replace it! The French at that time had not developed a consensus of what type of government they should have, and the reverberations of this echoed down into the 1930s and 40s. Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 10:25:17 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, Mark H Danley wrote: > >Looks pretty good - but keep in mind De Gaulle has to actually fight to >get all of Equatorial Africa; Chad rallies first, then Ubangi Shari. Two >Gaullist "emissaries" go to Duala in the Cameroons (I think one is >Leclerc), and stage what's basically a minicoup. But a Vichy general >named Tetu (I don't remember his first name) with a wopping four >battalions of colonial infantry resists in Gabon. After the Dakar fiasco, a >Free French force lands at Libreville in Gabon and defeats Tetu. Leclerc was instrumental in rallying French Equatorial Africa. The mini civil war that occurs there probably can be ignored. > Perhaps even after the determining the initial allegiance in the >post-armistice turn, we could allow the Allied player in future turns to >try an Operation Menace (the attempted forcible "rallying" of Dakar) or >two. Success would be unlikely at this point, but possible I suppose. Actually, it might be best in game terms to have all the French colonies stay loyal at first and then check them for rallying to the Free French a couple of months after the armistice goes into force. This may be a useful compression of what seems to be a single, drawn-out event. >Arthur Marder also wrote a book about the Dakar operation, I think called >_Defeat at Dakar_, and he saw the loss of surprise as the main cause of >the failure of the mission) In game turns, Menace would be Naval >Transporting a Royal Marine Brigade, whatever Free French ground forces >are in play, and a naval task force to a Vichy colonial holding box, and >rolling to see if they resist at full strength, half strength, or not at >all. Again, the first result should be the most likely. Besides lack of surprise, lack of overwhelming force helped doom the Dakar expedition. As I remember, using British troops (there were two Royal Marine brigades present) was more likely to provoke resistance than quell it, and the Free French force itself was equivalent to a rather weak brigade -- an insufficient show of force. Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 09:48:24 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Tue, 5 Mar 1996, James B. Byrne wrote: > We know what happened to France, because it did. And we can > project from that point. But reality is that the German Army > underwent a considerable re-organization between the end of the > Polish campaign and the beginning of the French. The > motorized/light panzer divisions particularly. If France had > pushed hard in the west while Germany's army was occupied in the > east, what would have been the political effect on Germany? > Would Hitler have faced the revolt of the generals in the fall > of '39 instead of '44? > > I raise this issue because its seems unbalanced to so finely > examine the options open to France while assuming that Germany > was invunerable to the political consequences of possible > French/Allied actions. A more dynamic French leadership, > militarily speaking, could have possibly forced a political > crisis in Germany equal to that suffered by France the following > spring. > -- Heck yeah! James is right, it works both ways: we should talk about such possibilities. I don't know enough about twentieth-century German history to offer an opinion with which I'd be comfortable, but some of you guys probably have ideas. Europa fans usually tend to be pretty well read on the whole. What James says on the surface seems plausible though - Basil Lidell-Hart always claimed that in the early war period Hitler's hold on power was tenuous in that the military went along with him only as long as spectacular victories kept flowing. On the other hand, they tolerate several years on non-spectacular-victories in the east until they try anything. Maybe someone who knows about Germany can tell us what it might take in 1940 to get a change in the German government of such magnitude that it will affect Germany' status in the game. Mark From: Jay Steiger/Forte Date: 6 Mar 96 10:28:55 PS Subject: Dumb Yuk A little levity for the board... When considering the behaviour of a howitzer: A mathematician will be able to calculate where the shell will land. A physicist will be able to explain how the shell gets there. An engineer will stand there and try to catch it. Budump bump... From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 07:57 GMT Subject: Fascination with Frenchmen I think the reason people are so interested in the outcome of fighting for control of a few 1-8 French regiments is probably because these goofy French units have a certain cachet...mountainous Senegalese infantry... Moroccan goumiers in striped uniforms...turbaned Spahi cavalry...Chasseurs d'Afrique...Chasseurs Marins in their pomponned Donald Duck hats...and the white-kepied bearded Germans and Spaniards of the legendary Legion Etrangere, a outfit wreathed in mystery and mystique. Folks like these have an aura that, for all its combat power, the 17th Guards Tank Corps, sometimes lacks. David H. Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 14:28:18 -0500 From: Nicholas Forte Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Tue, 5 Mar 1996 20:13:35 -0400 jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) wrote: >For the historical outcome of the French armistice, each colonial regional >area probably should have a 1/6 chance of going over to the Free French >(with die roll modifiers making it impossible for French North Africa to do >so at this level of armisitice). Historically, French Equatorial Africa >goes over, and the French military commander in the Levant tries to get the >Levant to go over but gets persuaded (reluctantly it seems) to stay loyal >to Vichy. John, You might think about rolling for French North Africa first and having the result of this roll modify the rolls for the other colonies. Since French North Africa is the most important French colony, with the largest overseas French population and the largest colonial military apparatus, its position would likely have a strong influence on the position of the other colonies. Nick Forte Reston, VA From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 08:29 GMT Subject: The fight for Sicily Hi, Rich. Good points on the defense of Sicily, but your basic point was pretty much what Hans Hube and Fridolin von Senger figured out...it wasn't worth it to expend the 14th Panzer Korps in Sicily. The Germans fought a masterful delaying action, and escaped from the island with virtually all their equipment. The big difference in game terms is that the Allied player is likely to hurl the Mediterranean air forces en masse against Palermo, Messina, and the other ferry links. According to Carlo d'Este's "Bitter Victory," the Allied air forces did a poor job at best of interfering with the Axis evacuation. Meanwhile, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had done such a masterful job of wrecking the Axis evacuation from Tunisia, quailed at sending his ships into the Straits of Messina. D'Este argues that Cunningham was frightened by a hideous ghost...that of the Dardanelles, where the words March 18, 1915, are still engraved on the side of a cliff, marking the day when the Royal Navy's seapower was defeated by Turkish gun batteries. A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various ahistorical invasions. Others might want to cut their losses both in materiel and victory points and not contest such an evacuation. It's certainly a cleft stick, fighting defense for Sicily. But one certainly gains insight into what it must have been like for Hube and Kesselring in those July and August days in 1943. Best, DHL From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 08:44 GMT Subject: Republique Francaise Very true on the weaknesses of the French Third Republic, which were immense (I am reading the last chapter of Shirer's book even as we speak). The nation was born after a massive military defeat and the political chaos of the Paris Commune. Almost immediately it ran into trouble with L'Affaire Dreyfuss, which nearly tore France apart. Right after that came the "Thy Jo" letters, alliances with Russia and Britain, foreign policy crises over Agadir and Morocco, and then WW1. That country never had a chance to breathe. Best, Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:47:33 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again > If France had > pushed hard in the west while Germany's army was occupied in the > east, what would have been the political effect on Germany? > Would Hitler have faced the revolt of the generals in the fall > of '39 instead of '44? Sure, given a big enough shock early enough, almost any country could give up, in some form. Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:53:14 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again >You might think about rolling for French North Africa first and having the >result of this roll modify the rolls for the other colonies. Since French >North >Africa is the most important French colony, with the largest overseas French >population and the largest colonial military apparatus, its position would >likely have a strong influence on the position of the other colonies. Yes, that's a good idea. From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 09:15 GMT Subject: Thanks from ChCh Dear Mark: Thanks for your kind note. I appreciate it. I checked last night...the guys on the Massilia were greeted at the Rabat pier by the Moroccan version of the flics and were arrested. One of them, Mandel, was imprisoned by Vichy milice and shot in early 1944. His main crimes were that he wanted to fight Germany and was Jewish. Police states, historian Roger Manvell pointed out, inevitably create a situation wherein the nation is run by the worst people in the state, usually criminals, who proceed to execute the nation's best minds. Keegan's comments on the French army are in Six Armies in Normandy, which was reprinted in 1994 for the 50th anniversary of D-Day. It's an excellent look at the Normandy campaign, with close-ups on the American, Canadian, Scottish, English, German, Polish, and French forces that fought in the hedgerows. It looks at what made these forces what they were, their national and social characteristics. It's quite fascinating. I don't think most of Europe particularly looked forward to fighting WW2, except maybe the Germans. The memories of WW1 were too devastating. A whole generation lay dead on the Flanders wire. The horrors of the Somme set off a wave of pacificism and a drive for disarmament that in turn led to appeasement. Chamberlain himself had lost several relatives in the trenches and, in a government job during WW1, had to send more to certain death. WW1 devastated him personally, and he was (like many other appeasers in Europe) determined to avoid a replay. What he got instead was something a hundred times worse. The worst thing that can befall the world, it sometimes seems, is when people try to do the right thing. Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:39:49 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again You know, Nick's idea about having to roll for North Africa first might not be bad - at least we could give the other colonies a positive mod. if North Africa rallies. I think this is good idea because all the possibilities involving a anti-Axis French regime after the armistice with greater credibility than DeGaulle involved North Africa. i.e., Boisson in Dakar would be more likely to go along with an anti-armistice in Darlan than he was historically with DeGaulle Mark Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:44:10 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again What John said and Dave backed up about the real cause of internal resistance to the Third Republic is also backed up by what I've read - old professor Paxton, the historian of Vichy in _Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order_ said that deep down inside, Vichy's leaders were really mad at the French Revolution, and its supposedly legacy, which was responsible for the decadence and immorality of the Third Republic - one can even interpret Vichy as the ultimate attempt at final revenge on the Revolution of 1789 by the hiers of the Ancien Regime. Mark Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:53:15 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again I realize you're inclined to dispense with the fighting in Gabon, and I think one certainly could and the simulation as a whole wouldn't suffer. (Guys I was kidding about the 18 maps for central Africa!) But FWBT gives us the whole Portugese Empire in the form of holding boxes, complete with some 1-6 Inf III's to inhabit it. If we've agreed that kind of detail was desirable, why not do the same for the French Empire. John mentioned earlier that a designer might condense all the events of June - September 1940 regarding the French Empire into one process for simplicity. Yeah, Grand Europa wouldn't suffer if we did. BUT we can probably treat it in a little more detail without and undue increase in complexity and decrease in playibility. Historically, the real importance of Equatorial Africa rallying (aside from rescuing DeGaulle from absolute obscurity) was that it was geographically important as a stop-over for transfering aircraft from British West Africa to the Middle East. Mark Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 14:49:33 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Holding Sicily > A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into >those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk >about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various >ahistorical invasions. Has anyone tried landings on the toe of Italy, to cut off the Axis troops even if they *do* want to evacuate Sicily? - Bobby. Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 15:15:39 -0600 (CST) From: Mark H Danley Subject: Re: France Falls Again On Wed, 6 Mar 1996, John M. Astell wrote: > > Actually, it might be best in game terms to have all the French colonies > stay loyal at first and then check them for rallying to the Free French a > couple of months after the armistice goes into force. This may be a useful > compression of what seems to be a single, drawn-out event. > > Besides lack of surprise, lack of overwhelming force helped doom the Dakar > expedition. As I remember, using British troops (there were two Royal > Marine brigades present) was more likely to provoke resistance than quell > it, and the Free French force itself was equivalent to a rather weak > brigade -- an insufficient show of force. > True but the anti-British element is a direct result of Mers-el-Kebir. Not that the French weren't resentful of the British already for supposedly betraying them in the Battle of France, but Mers-el-Kebir made a GREAT many French officers who were still pretty anti-Axis turn completely neutral. In game terms, if the British pull off a bloodless CATAPULT than the anti-British factor is less important. By the way, the lack of overwhelming force is important, and the mechanic used in Torch, wherein the number of RE's of landing Allied forces as compared to Vichy forces makes a difference might be useful if one does decide to represent Menace directly. Mark Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 16:13:02 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: France Falls Again >I realize you're inclined to dispense with the fighting in Gabon, and I >think one certainly could and the simulation as a whole wouldn't suffer. >(Guys I was kidding about the 18 maps for central Africa!) But FWBT >gives us the whole Portugese Empire in the form of holding boxes, >complete with some 1-6 Inf III's to inhabit it. If we've agreed that >kind of detail was desirable, why not do the same for the French Empire. Yes. There will be a master Africa chart with all sorts of holding boxes on it, right down to South Africa (War in the Desert will contain not only the North Africa forces and not only the East Africa forces, but even the South African home defense forces -- ever heard of the 5th Mounted Commando Division?) > Historically, the real importance of Equatorial Africa rallying >(aside from rescuing DeGaulle from absolute obscurity) was that it was >geographically important as a stop-over for transfering aircraft from >British West Africa to the Middle East. Indeed. While troops couldn't be sent that way (no rail connections and no good roads), aircraft could be shipped from Britain to West Africa and then could stage across central Africa to Egypt, thereby cutting 2-3 weeks off their transit time. From: NASU002.USAP@iac.org.nz (Public Affairs Officer) Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 11:27 GMT Subject: Operation Right Cross I've been weighing that very idea, a two-sided assault on the Straits of Messina, on the theory that the best way to take a bridge is from both ends at the same time. The terrain looks a little unnerving, though, and it's at the edge of Allied air cover. If you commit the carriers, it's possible, but it looks risky. I lean towards caution, mostly because I don't want a lot of disastrous operations and casualties thereof, but a two-sided assault on Messina has some attraction. It would certainly require maximum use of commando resources and airborne forces. Any ideas for Operation Right Cross? Dave Lippman Public Affairs Officer US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch, New Zealand From: pardue@hilda.mast.QueensU.CA (Keith Pardue) Subject: Holding Sicily (fwd) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 17:31:08 -0500 (EST) > > A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into > >those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk > >about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various > >ahistorical invasions. > > Has anyone tried landings on the toe of Italy, to cut off the Axis troops > even if they *do* want to evacuate Sicily? > > - Bobby. > > When I played the Axis, I was very paranoid about this possibility. This was one reason why I decided to evacuate Sicily. I had pretty reasonable forces in every hex in the toe and was built a fortified line south of the mountains to help contain an invasion there. I suppose that one reason to defend Sicily more agressively is to try to destroy some Allied naval units. If you do this enough, then the Allies will need to get pretty cautious. They may end the game with hundreds of Infantry RPs, but Naval RPs are more scarce. But, I think that if the Allies are careful with their naval forces, they can still cut off all of the forces in Sicily pretty easily. Best Wishes, Keith Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 00:20:57 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: The fight for Sicily DHL wrote > > Good points on the defense of Sicily, but your basic point was >pretty much what Hans Hube and Fridolin von Senger figured out...it >wasn't worth it to expend the 14th Panzer Korps in Sicily. The Germans >fought a masterful delaying action, and escaped from the island with >virtually all their equipment. > The big difference in game terms is that the Allied player is likely >to hurl the Mediterranean air forces en masse against Palermo, Messina, >and the other ferry links. According to Carlo d'Este's "Bitter Victory," >the Allied air forces did a poor job at best of interfering with the Axis >evacuation. > Meanwhile, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had done such a >masterful job of wrecking the Axis evacuation from Tunisia, quailed at >sending his ships into the Straits of Messina. D'Este argues that >Cunningham was frightened by a hideous ghost...that of the Dardanelles, >where the words March 18, 1915, are still engraved on the side of a >cliff, marking the day when the Royal Navy's seapower was defeated by >Turkish gun batteries. > A more aggressive Allied player might send air and naval power into >those straits and cut off a retreat...I noticed some of these posts talk >about the Allies taking a considerable amount of naval losses in various >ahistorical invasions. > Others might want to cut their losses both in materiel and victory >points and not contest such an evacuation. > > It's certainly a cleft stick, fighting defense for Sicily. But one >certainly gains insight into what it must have been like for Hube and >Kesselring in those July and August days in 1943. > > Best, > > DHL Speaking as a player who usually plays the Brits, I rather share Cunningham's serious reservations about sending a large chunk of the mediterranian fleet anywhere the Luftwaffe can munch on it. These are VERY valuable assets and whilst one must be willing to take losses to achieve ones goals, unless the Germans have, for some bizarre reason, positively packed Scilly with high value units, I'd be rather inclined to just do what damage I could with the RAF/USAAF. Of course, this statement rather depends on 'what the board looks like'. If the Luftwaffe is poorly deployed, I might consider a fairly large sortie into the straits. Nevertheless, my point is Cunningham's 'timid' decisions on this occasion, whilst certainly open to interpretation, were not without merit. Cunningham himself was a very good commander and I'm not sure he was wrong. All the best Perry ..._ From: Rich Velay Subject: GURU:SF Errata Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 18:48:08 PST Second Front Errata Supplement, Mar 3, 1996 John M. Astell, with Rich C. Velay Axis OB. (clarification) Note that there is no Fuhrer HQ garrison box in Second Front; this garrison is included for the purposes of Grand Europa. Fuhrer HQ garrison units do not enter SF through garrison activation. Axis OB. (clarification) Note that a port fortification may be placed at Toulon during initial set up, even though Toulon is an unimproved fortress. Note that the -1 DRM for the unimproved fortress is cumulative with the -1 DRM of the port fortification. Axis and Allied OB. (clarification) Note that the rule that allows permanent airfields and forts to be placed during initial deployment (by expending resouce points) does not require the airfield or port be placed in the same area where its resouce point can be deployed. A fort or airfield may be placed in any hex the player owns where such an item may be built. For example, using a resouce point that would deploy in mainland Italy per the deployement instructions, the Axis player may place a fort on Sicily -- or even in France or Germany. Allied OB. (addition) The following OB information is missing from the Allied OB booklet should appear immediately before the "Sequester" portion of the OB for Jul I 44 Jul I 1944 MTO, French: Convert: 1x 4-3-8 Art X CEF to: 1x 3-2-8 Art X 1C (Afr) 1x 3-2-8 Art X 2C (Col) Convert: 1x 2-3-8 Hvy AA X CEF AA=5 to: 2x 1-2-8 Hvy AA X (AA=3) 1C, 2C Rule 28B (correction) The sentence "A cargo naval group does not have a combat zone." is incorrect. Replace this sentence with "A cargo naval group has a combat zone in the hex it occupies." Rule 37E (addition) In addition to cities, activated garrison units may be also be placed in any fortress within the activated district or region, as appropriate. Rule 37E1 (clarification/correction) The Allied Malta garrison uses the point city of Valetta as its garrison activation hex. "Airborne" vs. "Air-Droppable" Certain rules confuse the terms "airborne units" (per the unit identification chart, this is a specific unit type: the airborne/parachute-infantry symbol) and "air-droppable units" (per Rule 24, these are all parachute, air landing/glider, and parachute commando units). "Air-droppable is the correct term for the following rules: Rule 24B1 (Hex Ownership): All mentions of "airborne unit" should be "air-roppable unit." Rule 40B2/B3 (Axis/Allied Replacements): All mentions of "airborne RE" should be "air-droppable RE." (The rules here limit the number of air- droppable REs that may be replaced). Ignore the note referring to an Allied airborne division requiring 9 months to be replaced. Note that a precise reading of the uncorrected rules would allow, for example, parachute or glider units to be replaced without limit, with only airborne/parachute-infantry units being limited. The corrected rule fixes this, although for simplicity it allows an anomaly that is addressed in an optional rule below. Airborne/Air-Droppable Replacements (Optional) The correction of the "airborne" vs "air-droppable" confusion creates an anomaly in the replacement system: divisions with the airborne/ parachute-infantry symbol are not affected by the limits on replacing "air-droppable" REs, even though many of these divisions break down into air-droppable components. This optional rule addresses this: The divisions listed below are affected by Rule 40B2/B3's limits on replacing air-droppable REs: American 14-8 Abn XX: 4 airdroppable REs are required to replace division at full strength 3 airdroppable REs are required to rebuild cadre to full strength 1 airdroppable RE is required to replace division at cadre strength American and British 11-8, 10-8, 10-6, 9-6 Abn XX: 3 airdroppable REs are required to replace division at full strength 2 airdroppable REs are required to rebuild cadre to full strength 1 airdroppable RE is required to replace division at cadre strength German 11-9-8, 9-8* Para-Inf XX: 1 airdroppable RE is required to replace division at full strength 1 airdroppable RE is required to rebuild cadre to full strength 0 airdroppable REs are required to replace division at cadre strength Italian 5-8 Para-Inf XX (184 Nm only): 1 airdroppable RE is required to replace division at full strength 1 airdroppable RE is required to rebuild cadre to full strength 0 airdroppable REs are required to replace division at cadre strength For any unit that requires more than one airdroppable RE to replace/rebuild, the player must replace/rebuild the unit incrementally. Each 3-month period, he may spend his airdroppable RE replacement limit for the unit, marking the unit with a convenient marker. Once the unit has sufficient airdroppable REs for replacement/ rebuilding, the player may spend the appropriate replacement points and actually replace/rebuild the unit. The Straits of Messina The standard rules do not cover the Axis use of the Straits of Messina (26:3822, 3823, 3923, where the rail ferries are) adequately. In particular, Rule 34J, Landing Craft as Ferries, is a simplification of the actual situation and allows the Allies to interdict the straits far better in the game than they did historically. The simplest solution is to allow the Axis player (only) to treat the Straits of Messina as narrow straits hexsides: The Axis player may treat any rail ferry in these hexes as a narrow straits hexside, provided he owns both hexes of the rail ferry. For example, the Axis player may treat the rail ferry on the 26:3822/3823 hexside as a narrow straits hexside if he owns both 26:3822 and 26:3823. An optional, albeit more complex, general solution to the landing craft as ferries will be published at a later date. RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY Date: Thu, 07 Mar 1996 01:06:52 -0500 From: Ray Kanarr Subject: Re: AREONAVAL Rich: You make a number of points with merit regarding Air and Naval operations in Europa. Your points are based on your personal preferences, which doesn't make them invalid, but doesn't make them universal sentiments either. I think that the many hours that would need to be spent learning and referring to the rules, and conducting these operations [as shown by the complexity of the SF invasion turn rules], are equally good reasons for avoiding the additional complexity that they introduce. However, all that this means is that there is an excellent argument for computerizing these functions, as well as things like supply [operational and strategic], rail, naval, and air transport, and a number of other time-intensive operations. The arguments that used to be valid objections against computerization of some or all of Europa, namely storage capacity and processing speed, no longer exist. As for taking time from other Europa-related projects to devote time to developing strategic air or detailed naval systems, with the statement that only one person is devoting time to development [I would presume that person is John Astell], I stated here months ago that more people should get involved in Europa, and there were several VOLUNTEERS to do just that, and this is a tune that I've been playing for years. The fact that the powers that be have not investigated or exploited the resource of the Europa hobbyists is not for lack of people wanting to get involved. And if the Europa development team is not going to do anything about things like Strategic Air; Detailed Naval; and Balkan Partisan systems anyhow, then what is the harm in letting some of the other people who have a love of all things Europa to have a crack at it? At worst, they produce something which doesn't get an official stamp of approval; at best, they produce a breakthrough that elevates the system even more. If this is heresy, then all I can say is "Be of good cheer, Master Ridley, for we shall this day set a light which, by God's good grace, shall never be put out." [Invitations to British Europa fans to identify this misquote]. Ray the K Date: 07 Mar 96 01:17:00 EST From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com> Subject: RE: The Vichy armistice The discussion on the various options for dealing with the Vichy armistice points out one of the formidable problems with Grand Europa: If the Vichy response to German terms is variable, shouldn't the German terms themselves be variable, or optional? A can of worms, but difficult to ignore. The Vichy option for neutrality would have been unthinkable if the Germans had demanded the fleet, and/or even one of the major colonies. It's been argued on this list that players don't and shouldn't represent the political leadership of the powers, but political options like the content of the German terms can't be excluded from GE without inevitable and serious distortions, since the historical politics were grounded in the historical strategic situations. The German treatment of France, shrewd under the circumstances, was based on analyses that might look significantly different in the midst of a game of Grand Europa. What if Italy is neutral? What if the USSR is active? This sort of issue is one of the main reasons I'm convinced that GE is unworkable without computer support to handle the maze of factors that would have to be considered in formulating the probabilities, ramifications, and VP costs of political events-in-context. I don't especially like computer games - I'll always prefer the expanse of a maptable and the look and feel of an infamous 18-10 in my hand. But some things are too important and yet too tedious to be either ignored or done manually. Strategic warfare, economics, and maybe a naval support module would seem to be other aspects that would need to be computerized to make GE feasible. Jim Arnold Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 03:27:01 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: GURU:SF Errata > The standard rules do not cover the Axis use of the > Straits of Messina (26:3822, 3823, 3923, where the > rail ferries are) adequately. In particular, Rule > 34J, Landing Craft as Ferries, is a simplification > of the actual situation and allows the Allies to > interdict the straits far better in the game than > they did historically. The simplest solution is to > allow the Axis player (only) to treat the Straits > of Messina as narrow straits hexsides: The Axis > player may treat any rail ferry in these hexes as a > narrow straits hexside, provided he owns both hexes > of the rail ferry. For example, the Axis player may > treat the rail ferry on the 26:3822/3823 hexside as > a narrow straits hexside if he owns both 26:3822 > and 26:3823. An optional, albeit more complex, > general solution to the landing craft as ferries > will be published at a later date. Ooops -- there goes yesterday's easy Allied solution to Sicily! Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 03:23:24 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: GURU:SF Errata > > Second Front Errata Supplement, Mar 3, 1996 > John M. Astell, with Rich C. Velay Give those men a medal!