From: "David H. Thornley" Subject: Re: GE debate rages on! Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:38:44 -0600 (CST) > > Like Yul Brynner in *Westworld*, the GE debate just won't be stopped! > Unless we start sending pictures; we can't possibly clog the whole band- width of the net just arguing with words, after all! > I have an opinion on everything. This is my topic of topics, so please > allow me to opine on your vision of Grand Europa... I've got opinions, can I play too? > >* Germany and Poland, France and Britain are at war at > >start. Everyone except Germany at Neutrality Watch, Germans > >get free set up. > >* Italy must enter war, by conducting ground operations > >against Fr or GB, before the surrender/collapse/armistice of > >a major power or they lose the game. We might want to extend this principle to other possible Axis powers; maybe Spain signs on after one major power has fallen and England is invaded? > >* Historical Nazi-Soviet Pact (with possibilities for > >minor border adjustments as was the case) > >* No Japanese attack on USSR. > >* Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria minor Axis-Allies from > >historical date (1 or 2 turns either way could be used) Iffy. I might go along with this for simplicity's sake, but I think we're sweeping an awful lot of stuff under the rug. >[snip] > > >* Germany must invade the USSR before Aug I '41, or they > >lose the war. > > This could really screw the Germans. Why not say before August 1943? Make > the Allies guess. > I kinda like the Third Reich approach: let the Soviet Union declare war any time they like after (say) Aug I '41. Without the German surprise turn. We'd have to divide Soviet reinforcements into peacetime and wartime, but that shouldn't be all that difficult. I think we'll find the Germans attacking the Soviet Union more or less at the historical time. > >* Adolph and Benito declare war on US Dec I '41 > > Again, this could really force the German to shoot themselves. What if > Russia is doing better than in real life? Hitler declared war on the USA > when the German fortunes in Russia were not so high, but if a total > disaster had occured, then maybe he wouldn't have. Are we to assume that > total disasters won't occur in the game? > Of all the political and economic decisions of the war, this is the one that is the least operational and the most political. From a point of view of playing Europa, and avoiding political and economic systems, we'd do just as well playing Days of Decision II as we would not having the Axis declare war on the U.S. There is no reason for Germany to do this, in the game just as much as in real life. The only effect is that the Allies start getting lots of green counters with large numbers on them in '43 and '44; how the blazes do you ever get the Axis players to do something so stupid? If Germany is suffering disasters in Russia, fine. They're going to lose anyway, and keeping the Americans out isn't going to change that. There is no justification for cutting the Axis any slack. It would be just as reasonable to start in '38, after Churchill dominates the Munich conference. > >* Historical Air and Naval production, modified by ability > >to retain more of unspent ARPs and NRPs, but these can not > >be converted into new or different units. > > I would argue for a slightly more liberal approach- adding a few more > counters of various types to let people play around with alternate air > reinforcements. > The ground reinforcements probably are no big deal; we might want to pull some out of the OB, dump them (and some other forces) in a pool, and let the players decide which to build. If the players want a bit more armor, or a bit more mountain troops, and are willing to sacrifice some infantry (or vice versa) it shouldn't hurt. I feel much the same way about the air OB, but it's a little trickier. We can (I think) afford to let the players change the bomber/fighter/attack/transport ratio somewhat, but it would be unhistorical to let them tune the reinforcements to get only the best aircraft. Either let them change the numbers of types only, or do the World in Flames thing (let's see, did I draw a P-39 or a P-38 this turn?). > >* France must sign armistice when offered (as in FoF) > >* Vichy sets up as historical as far as territorial > >divisions. Commitment to Axis depends on events, pressure > >and a table. > > I would tentatively agree to rules like this, if only to get the design > process underway. If the French have basically been forced to sue for > peace, then they shouldn't have many other options. It would be useful to > have an alternative scenario in which France either fights on, or the Axis > decide to just occupy them in toto and seize as much of North Africa as > they can get. > We've been hashing this out for a while, and I think we've got usable solutions. Just as long as France only surrenders when militarily defeated, and just as long as the Vichy/Free French/whatever makes some sort of sense. I think it would do no harm to the game if the Axis could take a "no surrender" option, and I think that allowing the French to fight on from Africa if they've held out in Europe long enough would work fine. > >* Spain and Turkey as historical. Attitude based on > >changed circumstances to be developed, but no Turkey joins > >Axis/Allies based on one die roll or chit pick. > > Yeah- I'm against random die rolling for random allies, but something like > the Finnish War Effort Rules might be workable here if the circumstances > bring them into the war. > Turkey, like most countries, can be allowed to be neutral until somebody attacks, or can be allowed in very late to join in the victory. Spain, I think, had more of a chance of joining the Axis. Possibly if France fell and a significant German force was in England and in supply. Even then, I think Spain would be unenthusiastic and easy to remove from the war. > >* Military technology remains as historical. > >* Economic war, ie Strat air and U-boat campaign as much > >in the background as possible, SF Strat air good example. Fine with me. The problem with economic war is that it isn't Europa and it can drastically influence the game. The only kicker is that it should pay to occupy the traditional real estate: as many Atlantic ports as possible for the Germans, Italy for the Allied Mediterranean strat bombing campaign. Other than that, the closer to the historical results, the better. Not that I have any objections to a scenario in Europa concerning major changes, of course, but I would like to see GE stay out of this. > >* Task Force Naval system. No. For all but a few campaigns, that's far too much of a naval system. Granted that GE will require some more attention to the ocean than most of its components do, it should require as little as possible. > >* OB based on Replacement points (Inf, Art, Arm) to > >"build" historical units (largely, some variation for > >circumstances permitted) > > I would agree that these might be useful concepts for a basic Grand Europa, > but I would certainly want to see more flexibility in all those areas-the > sooner the better. > Commented on above. > >* No random events, no Political Instability Table, no > >player control of the "Home Front", no players for minor > >powers. (Random Events: that are game breakers or > >significantly distort history) > > In the case of minor countries, once they get into the war, most of them > become too intermingled with allied forces to differentiate a player for, > say Roumania. > I haven't seen anyone advocating Ronald Reagan movie rules, House > Unamerican Activity Rules, War Bond or Scrap Metal Drive rules, ((unless > you mean economics)) then I'm with you on leaving out the home front. > The problem with the random events that distort history is that the blasted things did happen, and I'm not comfortable saying that one improbable thing happens and another didn't just because that's how it worked out in real life. I agree with game-breaking random events, though. Italy does not join the Allies until defeated. Spain doesn't join the war while it still might help the Axis if they did. No small planetoid crashes into central Europe in May II '40. The U.S. joins the war at the historical time. > > To which some will reply, "But you are just refighting > >WW II!" Exactly. Completely right. Bravo! Hit the nail > >on the head. There is something of a continuum here. At one end, I can curl up in a comfortable chair, and read Weinberg or Willmott or whoever. Moving along slightly, I can play individual Europa games, making sure that my decisions are the historical ones (i.e., SF starting with Sicily, invading Salerno, Anzio, Normany, South France at the right times). Or I can play Europa games in historical order without worrying about making the exact historical decisions. We now move on to what I want to see: a game in which we can make our own decisions, so Germany can attack whoever the German player wants when he wants to do it, etc. This could lead to a considerably different WWII, but I don't see that as a problem, any more than I see a quick southern France invasion as a SF problem, or the possibility of an Army Group Center offensive in 1942 is a SE problem. If I continue down that continuum a long ways, of course, I get to World in Flames with all the expansions, especially including Days of Decision II. I assume that this, in particular, is what we don't want for Europa. (To paraphrase Stroustrup, Europa is not the best WiF, WiF is the best WiF. And, if you want WiF, you know where to find it.) On the other hand, if I am artificially limited in where I can push my units, or if odd military results early in the game make the OB ludicrous later in the game, I'm not going to be happy. > > Europa, IMO, is an operational level game depicting WW > >II at the divisional level, with those air and naval aspects > >which had a significant impact upon the ground war. Precisely what I want to see out of GE, with the proviso that the expanded size necessitates strategic decisions that were nicely wrapped into the initial setups of the component games. In other words, in a game covering all of WWII, it will be necessary to make some strategic and economic decisions. I'd like to see these kept as simple and unobtrusive as possible, and no simpler and no less obtrusive. If the game favors a German approach of Poland- France-Balkans-USSR, that's just fine. If it mandates it, who needs it? > > It is not a series of maps and OB provided to gamers to > >play "The war of 1939-194? as it might have been if x,y and > >z did or didn't happen." It is not a blown-up version of > >3dR, nor WIF, nor WW II or any other Strategic-politico game > >on the time period between 1939 and whenever. It is not a > >early 1940s version of Empires in Arms, Diplomacy, Risk or > >Badminton. > So how about the war in 1943-1945 if the Western allies make lots of different decisions on returning to the continent? We seem to find that just fine for a Europa game. Again, if I want nothing but re-creation of the historical situations, I'll read a book. > > Europa games are 70% ground combat, 20% tactical air > >force, 5% naval; leaving 5% for politics, production, coup > >die rolls, etc and 0% for alternative political history. > > If you mean alternative history to include things like a Communist Germany > allying with Russia against whatever... then I'm with you. (although I > guess I'd be happy to game *that* too if somebody with the basement and the > time wanted to do it) > At one Europafest, I saw somebody agree to play Poland in Case White provided the Reds came in on his side. No problem. (He lost anyway.) I have no problems with people doing strange things with Europa components, as long as they don't do it in the street and block traffic. On the other hand, is it really alternative political history if France hangs on until October and continues to fight from North Africa? (It is if the Axis doesn't declare war on the U.S. in Dec I '41, I assure you.) Is it alternative political history if Germany pulls off Sealion and Spain joins the Axis? Is it alternative political history if Italy doesn't attack Greece, the Balkans remain partly neutral, and Germany starts Barbarossa a turn or two earlier? How about if the British decide to try to finish off Tripolitania at Greece's expense? If these are "alternative political history", and hence forbidden, what's the point of GE after all? Europa games covering all the major campaigns are safely in my closet (OK, so Fall of France and Their Finest Hour could use revision); the only point I see in writing additional rules is to allow different things to happen. David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O- Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota, its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels. Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart. Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:40:01 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX [longish] >>A number of the units in the SE holding box are fulfilling >>similar functions, like the 22 Luftland on Crete and Rhodes >>(either place, at various times) and the Lehr and 21st >>Panzer Divs that so inconveniantly go there over >>winter/spring '44. > >As I stated in another context, it makes much more sense to generally >state that: upon fulfillment of condition "a" [in the case that you >cite, the fall of Africa], "x" number of REs [or AFs or DFs] need >to garrison geographic region "512" [in this case, the Balkan >states]. Better yet, the Europa partisan rules should "require" a player to decide how much occupation force is needed, and make him suffer consequences if he tries to skimp. As to the presence of 1st Pz in the Balkans, that will depend on the Axis player's judgements as to 1) whether it is useful for anti-partisan warfare under the rules, and 2) what he feels like the prospects for an Allied invasion of the region are and what forces could best meet it. In other words, we may not need any special rules at all for Europa. The problem only occurs when playing scenarios that don't include all fronts, and here I can see no choice but to start with historical provisions. Granted, an early collapse in the East or West would have had the Germans drawing on garrisons in quiet regions. Perhaps scenarios such as CoT should allow borrowing from the SE garrison for a VP penalty, or beefing it up for a VP bonus (shades of AH's _1914_!). But the best solution would be to include the SE front in the scenario, and give both sides their full range of military options. >As for mathematical blind doo dah hocus pocus about near- >infinite permutations, that's a lot of eyewash [as my granddad would >say. Dear Lord, I'm not turning into my father, I'm turning into my >grandfather!]. To paraphrase the paraphrase of the Luftwaffe Fat Man, >"when I hear the word factorial, I reach for my gun.' My earlier post of hocus pocus eyewash was more directed toward political rules than toward garrisoning, but it the problem arises even here, if only to a lesser extent. For instance, your sample/conceptual rules would not let possession of Gibraltar have any effect on the size of the Axis occupation forces in the Balkans, but I suspect it would have a big effect on the allocation of any forces intended to resist invasion (vs. partisans). The problem is that effects don't arise from purely local causes (much more so for political than for strictly military effects, but to some extent even then). It's when you have to account for things everywhere on the map that you get the combinatorial explosion that makes it difficult to even specify the charts, let alone to playtest them. I mentioned only Gibraltar, but what about Suez/Alexandria, prior Allied naval losses, Allied commitments elsewhere, etc. The ones we *don't* think of are a bigger source of trouble than the ones we do. - Bobby. From: Rich Velay Subject: GE cont. Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1996 20:45:43 PST From: Ray Kanarr To: richv@icebox.iceonline.com Cc: europa@lysator.liu.se Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX [longish] >On 3/14/96, Rich Velay [speaking AS Rich Velay] stated: >>The main reason 1st Panzer was sent to Greece was to >>guard against an anticipated Allied landing, after Africa >>was lost. They weren't there as part of the Anti-Partisan >>garrison so much as a mobile reserve to protect Hitler's >>southern flank. >That's exactly the point: If Africa is not lost on the >historic timetable; if the Axis is doing much better [or >worse] in the USSR than historically; if the Allies decide >on and execute a cross-Channel attack in 1943; etc., etc., >what rationale is there for any particular unit to be >forcibly sent to, or forced to remain in, a particular >geographic location? I don't know. Perhaps when GE is published it will have garrisons handled differently than they are in the single front game SF. I would imagine so, anyway. As to how it is handled, I guess we'll know when we get the shrink wrap off of the box. :) >>A number of the units in the SE holding box are fulfilling >>similar functions, like the 22 Luftland on Crete and >>Rhodes (either place, at various times) and the Lehr and >>21st Panzer Divs that so inconveniantly go there over >>winter/spring '44. >As I stated in another context, it makes much more sense to >generally state that: upon fulfillment of condition "a" [in >the case that you cite, the fall of Africa], "x" number >of REs [or AFs or DFs] need to garrison geographic region >"512" [in this case, the Balkan states]. As for >mathematical blind doo dah hocus pocus about near- infinite >permutations, that's a lot of eyewash [as my granddad would >say. Dear Lord, I'm not turning into my father, I'm turning >into my grandfather!]. To paraphrase the paraphrase of the >Luftwaffe Fat Man, "when I hear the word factorial, I reach >for my gun.' Wjat you propose will almost assuredly be incorporated into GE, in one permutation or another. Of course, that's just a guess on my part. >The following is entirely on the fly: > [...] >Given that I have simplified this somewhat [but ONLY >somewhat], and that it is only for one aspect of the >overall job, it certainly isn't a task where the >constellations will have shifted unrecognizably before its >done! Very impressive stuff. My only comment would be that I would prefer to see C/M REs also tracked by AEC. For example, I don't like the idea of the Axis avoiding the loss of 1st Pz XX to the Balkans by simply loading up the garrison box with Mot MG battalions and Mot Inf regiments. Beyond that, it all looks very interesting and well thought out. >>The hand of Dolph is never far away when looking at any >>German move.... >While that's an accurate strategic assessment in its >historical context, to say that the hand of Uncle Adolf is >inflexible under any conditions buys more into the German >General Staff apologists than it does help create a >simulation. There are indeed certain activities that can be >proscribed as being out of touch with the historical >realities of who Hitler was [the German armed forces will >NOT engage in a runaway defense!], but to state that he >would have dictated the exact same activities by the same >units [or types of units] under varying conditions ignores >his actual, historical responses to situations that DID >exist. Oh, I don't know. Uncle Dolph had a pretty limited repetoire of reactions to events from winter 41 on. "Defend to the last man", "Kill him", "Never give up", "Kill them" seems to pretty much cover the essentials. One has to make a pretty narrow design window to look through when designing a game, even one as expansive as Europa. The more you include, the worse the game is as a game. That's what I think, anyway. >Sorry to blather on, but the insistance that historical >units/ unit types go to [or stay in] in historical regions >under quasi-historical [at best] Europa circumstances takes >Europa out of the realm of historical simulation, and >squarely into the realm of historical game, and eliminates >the option of a Grand Europa. Europa, IMO, *is* a game, and can do no more as a "simulation" than simulate one man's opinions about WW II. And whether or not having a heavy hand on Strategic or National Leader questions eliminates the option of GE, I don't know. It appears to eliminate your version of GE; it doesn't seem to eliminate my version. >The mandates from above the level of player decision- >making should be: >DIRECTIVE [you must do this if this], >GENERAL [x number of >REs (not 169th Inf Div., 1st Pz Div., >and 369th Emergency Lederhosen Bde) go here], >CONSTRAINED BY EVENTS, NOT TIME [until either the Allies >are no longer adjacent, or an anti-Axis revolt occurs, x >REs must remain in region 512], >and ACTUALLY STRATEGIC, AND NOT OPERATIONAL IN NATURE. Interesting ideas, and a pretty good way of handling it. Probably, GE will incorporate much of this. or at least something vaguely similar. >Otherwise, we might as well play 3R. This is not rocket >science, you know. Historical research is time-consuming >and generally thankless, as John Astell could probably tell >you, but its not like building a V-2. You're supposed to >get some enjoyment out of it. Ray Not too sure what this is refering to. I already have 3dR and don't want a divisional level version. And the only historical research I do, I do *for* my own enjoyment. Anyway, I enjoyed your post. Hope you get what you want from Europa. late/R RichV@Icebox.Iceonline.com Europa, tomorrow's games about yesterday, TODAY Date: 15 Mar 96 02:34:34 EST From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: The Battle for Rome and 3-3-2 > Hurray! Tell 'em, Jim. (Except I'd vote for 5-5-3 instead of your 4-4-3.) > > - Bobby. You rascal, you. I actually meant to say "6-6-3". Jim Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 01:37:08 -0600 From: bdbryant@mail.utexas.edu (Bobby D. Bryant) Subject: GR/D web site. The GR/D web site now lets you browse the list of persons who have signed the guest book. It includes e-dresses, so you might find it useful for looking up people who haven't posted here lately. (I also notice that the main page shows you how to get on this list.) - Bobby. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 13:43:03 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: Grand Europa >RE: German Declaration of War on US >If Germany did not DW on US then the allies wouldn't have taken some of the >heavier naval losses sufered in late-41/early-42. > US lend lease shipments to Britain in 1942 would have increase. > Allied shipyards could have been building more LC. > US "volunteers" would probably have joined the RAF in large numbers. >Hitler couldn't ignore these actions, and would have been baited into >declaring war sooner or later. US troop movements to Europe didn't amount >to much before mid-42 anyway. Yes, more lend lease would have reached Britain in 1942, but why would this force Hitler to declare war? The more likely scenario is that German submarines would attack US ships more and more, with the USN escalating its response, until the American public was outraged at German attacks on neutral (US) shipping and the US declared war. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 14:26:01 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX in the Balkans I don't get all this hand wringing about the 1st Pz Div having to being in the SE theater. Just take a look at the SF rules: you determine what you do with the forces in a theater you control, including sending them anywhere in any theater you control. Only units specifically listed as being part of a garrison are restricted, (and only while the garrison hasn't been activated). Now, take a look at the SE theater: 1st Panzer and tons of other forces that deploy in the SE aren't part of the SE GARRISON, and you'll be able to send them anywhere you want in E and GE scenarios where you control the SE. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 14:26:36 -0400 From: jastell@crossover.com (John M. Astell) Subject: Re: Mussolini and Graziani > As far as Rodolfo Graziani goes, he was extremely brave in fighting >badly-armed Libyan and Ethiopian tribesmen. He also was quite right, the >Italian 6th and 10th Armies were in no shape for offensive warfare. I often wonder why an opponent becomes "badly armed" and primitive ("tribesmen") when you want to disparage the accomplishments of their foe? Fighting qualities count for a whole lot more -- I far more prefer to face a heavily-armed creampuff nationality/group (insert the name of your favorite here), than a poorly armed Libyan and Ethiopian force! The Ethiopians after all had beat the 19th Century Italian invasion at Adowa -- the only indigenous people south of the Sahara to defeat a 19th Century European invader and keep their independence. The Libyans were good fighters, too. Neither rolled over and played dead in the face of the Italians. The Rif Moroccans were poorly armed vis-a-vis the French, but that didn't make them contemptable. Rifles and machineguns against clubs and spears is certainly a mismatch, but that didn't make the Zulu wars in general or the Battle of Isandlwana in particular a walk-over for the British. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 19:12:46 -0500 From: Ray Kanarr Subject: Re: 1st Pz XX in the Balkans John M. Astell, on 3/15/96, wrote, >I don't get all this hand wringing about the 1st Pz Div >having to being in the SE theater. -snip- >Only units specifically listed as being part of a garrison are >restricted, (and only while the garrison hasn't been >activated). -snip- >1st Panzer and tons of other forces that deploy in the SE >aren't part of the SE GARRISON, and you'll be able to >send them anywhere you want in E and GE scenarios >where you control the SE. John [and others], Apologies for not being clear in my earlier post. The issue regarding 1st Pz Div. et al. was related to a recent SF game in which the Allies opted for a continental invasion in 1943. Given this, it was decided that a reasonable course of action for the Axis was to allow all non-garrison units in the SE Theatre free movement, as per the rules [but also in contravention of the rules, as SE Theatre is not in play], and to allow for the release of German units in garrison, as long as they were replaced with equivalent Italian units [the issue of the Bulgarian sphere of influence was not addressed]. This led to the discussion of why the SE Theatre is not in play, and why garrisons are related to specific units after initial, historical placement [rather than based on a number of Axis/Allied REs, or AFs, or DFs, (except for training/ replacement type units, for which there is some rationale for them to be tied to specific areas) once play has started], or even to specific levels of forces, irrespective of the overall strategic/operational situation. It didn't start out as being about 1st Pz Div. at all, per se. Ray Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:21 -0800 From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve) Subject: Re: GE politics >SF gives a great example of the implausibility of the notion of Europa >players representing individuals: what individual or body had the ability to >decide when and where the Allies returned to the continent, but also had the >responsibility of deciding which fighter groups should escort which air raid >along the Rhine or of ensuring sufficient anti-tank assets (and which ones) >were "stacked with" individual divisions on the Italian front? I recently came to this conclusion myself. While I continue to advocate optimal flexibility and decision making power of players, it seems more logical to say that the player represents simply the decision making bodies of the country he plays- in Britain, Churchill annoyed his commanders by meddling, the office of CIGS changed hands at least once that I can recall offhand, front commanders were sacked, transferred, kicked upstairs... So a player can't be said to represent a specific person (thus rendering pointless arguments back and forth about Hitler being assasinated or Marshall being sent to Europe instead of Ike.) really- is that your opinion as well? "Freedom is always against the law." -J.R. "Bob" Dobbs Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:43:49 -0800 From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve) Subject: If Hitler won the war. > Books like these entertain, and they also hold our feet to the fire. >We realize just what the world might have been like had Hitler won the >war. I have a hard time believing the British would have had it much worse than the French- which is to say not bad at all. Django Reinhardt continued to play at the Hot Club. Things didn't get really bad until the pressure on Germany mounted and they started leaning on the French to implement anti-Semitic regulations and shortages started hitting more severely. As far as Fatherland, where Germany has a moribund economy- compare this with the economy of Chile, Brazil or Argentina- all these countries were seen in the 50s as the up and coming powers, but in all of them, military coups led by Fascist military officers took place. These regimes thoroughly gutted their economies by following the export oriented Chicago school economic model. Germany, however was not under the Imperial aegis of the United States- indeed a primary reason for Germany's fighting the war in the first place was to achieve autarky. When it became clear that Hitler was serious about making Germany independent of the system envisioned by the US, that elites in the west turned against Hitler. But not entirely. Texaco Oil, for instance sent as much oil as possible to Germany before it became impossible to do so. Henry Ford kept an autographed picture of the Fuhrer close at hand. Sosthanes Behn of ITT was similarly an admirer. ITT is known for its active support for autocratic regimes. Germany had a dynamic capitalist economy which was organized in the same way as it is today. In fact, the major players are largely the same. Did you know that I.G. Farben still exists? It just changed its name. In fact, if you buy a music album on cassette, that cassette is manufactured by BASF, which is part of the new Farben combine. Steve P. "Freedom is always against the law." -J.R. "Bob" Dobbs Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:15 -0800 From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve) Subject: Re: Italy Dave the Public Affairs Officer finished with: > So whatever shape Italy takes in Europa (I find it hard to see as an >independent player, but it could be done), it will have to reflect on the >personality of this sawdust Caesar, this strutting pretender, whose image >remains that of Mussolini's shaven skull, head flung back, jaw pointed >up, as he delivers yet another bellicose and bombastic speech to his army >of claques, forever thrusting out a flabby, insubstantial aggression >towards the world. Curtain Falls...thunderous applause! This man should be writing the promo material to all the Europa games. I would agree that Mussolini was a washout and a joke as a stateseman. But it should be remembered that prior to WW2, he was not so villified. Winston Churchill wrote peans of praise as did FDR and others. Mussolini's methods were admired widely by the decision makers of Europe and the United States. Which leads me to make the point that Italy would do well to have an independent player- to be rewarded by attempting to play a game of upsmanship with Germany-all the time pushing Italy far beyond its realistic capabilities. If only because it was supposed that Italy might prove to be as formidable on the battlefield as they looked in the newsreels. And perhaps they may have accomplished something if they'd picked their fights better. Steve P. "Politicians have neither the training, nor the inclination for strategic thought." --General Jack T. Ripper, USAF in *Dr. Strangelove* "Freedom is always against the law." -J.R. "Bob" Dobbs Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 16:44:43 -0800 From: zaius@teleport.com (Steve) Subject: Re: GE politics >As for Spain: > >Why wait until 1941 when you can invade in 1940? No need to upset your >timetable in Russia. While your at it, why not invade the Balkans in 1940? A realistic logistical system (or one that at least imposes realistic constraints) should make planning something like a German invasion of France leading directly to an invasion of Spain more involved than just taking it on the fly. Consequenses to invading a country seen both at home and abroad as an ally of sorts should be a powerful deterrent. Steve P "Freedom is always against the law." -J.R. "Bob" Dobbs Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 03:22:47 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: If Hitler won the war. I am sorry about the political rant that follows....actually, I am not sorry at all (but do not take offense, please) Steve wrote: >As far as Fatherland, where Germany has a moribund economy- compare this >with the economy of Chile, Brazil or Argentina- all these countries were >seen in the 50s as the up and coming powers, but in all of them, military >coups led by Fascist military officers took place. These regimes >thoroughly gutted their economies by following the export oriented Chicago >school economic model. Crumbs! I see we have **VERY** different views on economics. I am an honest-to-goodness-real-in-the-flesh advocate of Austrian school economist (of which the Chicago school is an off-shoot). We also have a rather different take on the history of Chile under Pinochet. >Germany, however was not under the Imperial aegis of the United States- >indeed a primary reason for Germany's fighting the war in the first place >was to achieve autarky. When it became clear that Hitler was serious about >making Germany independent of the system envisioned by the US, that elites >in the west turned against Hitler Likewise, I suspect our opinions re. the dynamics of real world international politics and economics are so dissimilar as to suggest we are talking about different planets >But not entirely. Texaco Oil, for >instance sent as much oil as possible to Germany before it became >impossible to do so. Henry Ford kept an autographed picture of the Fuhrer >close at hand. Sosthanes Behn of ITT was similarly an admirer. ITT is >known for its active support for autocratic regimes. >Germany had a dynamic capitalist economy which was organized in the same >way as it is today. Argg! To describe a fascist economy as capitalistic is, well, bizarre. The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal) property rights. In crude terms (very crude), a (true) socialist economy is one in which the state owns the means of production. In a fascist economy, the means of production are (to varying degrees) in private hands but under such a very high degree of state regulation. There is little practical difference in purely macroeconomics terms. In both cases, market forces are largely ignored. So if a large multi-national company supports a nasty regime in return for favours, that does not mean this is a *capitalist* thing to do. Having the state do favours for your company is a distortion of market forces and hence a diminution of capitalist market forces. It may or may not be a good idea, but it aint capitalism. The name National Socialist (Nazi) is very accurate. It is a mutant form of SOCIALISM not capitalism. Marxist descriptions of fascism as *late capitalism* are absurd. For a good refutation read 'The Road to Serfdom' by Hajak. Some people think it strange that Mussolini started off as a Communist: not really. Both systems have a horror of self regulating mechanisms such as markets. Of course, a plain vanilla socialist (as opposed to National socialist) system has much the same structural (and subjectivist, dare I say Platonic) qualities as a fascist one, but aims to manipulate the state for the benefit of a different group of people that a Nazi regime. Please note: I am talk ECONOMICS here and not such weirdness as the racial or nationalist aspects of a fascist regime. Socialist systems can be utterly savage (Stalin) or ostensibly benign. Fascist systems can be utterly savage or, well, somewhat savage (Franco). Suffice to say that statist societies of any form are not to my taste, but that is just my opinion. Does ANY of this have anything to do with Europa? Well, a bit (but only a bit). The various economic aspects of fascist/socialist/capitalist/groucho marxist societies is largely irrelevant. All we care about is how many tanks/aircraft/ships/lederhosen etc. each combatant nation produced and when. The reason the USA out produced the Germans in just about everything may have been because they had a powerful capitalist economy: or it may have been because Elanor Roosevelt wore rather nice hats and the hot-dogs on Conney Island inspired superhuman productivity (probably the later). This is, of course, utterly irrelevant. The bald facts of what the Yanks DID produce are all we need to know. However, if we have a dramatically different take on the political interaction between the various nations: THAT could seriously colour how we attempt a Europa simulation of what is/is not politically possible. If you take the view that an Imperial America was behind the actions of the British and French in 1939 (or whenever), well, I doubt there is going to be much meeting of the minds with a person such as myself, who thinks that the British, French and Americans all had their own agendas. If France did not fall, it is hard to see the Anglo-French alliance not pursuing its war aims without asking Washington if it is okay with them. I must say I rather enjoy reading other peoples views on such matters and I DO hope no one (particularly Steve) is offended by my views. If anyone IS offended, well, too bad: nevertheless, causing offence is not what I am setting out to do. Any continuation of this topic is probably best done away from the Europa forum as we are starting to enter another realm here. Send me your Comments/Kudos/Brickbats directly, I am a big boy, I can take it ! (However, irrational flames will be ignored, as always) Regards Perry ...- P.S. Perry says: *Turning to socialism for fear of fascism is like suicide for fear of death* From: "David H. Thornley" Subject: Re: GE cont. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 21:23:11 -0600 (CST) > >On 3/14/96, Rich Velay [speaking AS Rich Velay] stated: > >>The main reason 1st Panzer was sent to Greece was to > >>guard against an anticipated Allied landing, after Africa > >>was lost. They weren't there as part of the Anti-Partisan > >>garrison so much as a mobile reserve to protect Hitler's > >>southern flank. > Well, if Greece is considered a possible invasion area, the problem is solved. The Germans can put a panzer division there, or they can cut the garrison to the bone and figure the Western Allies will probably invade somewhere else. Not a problem. Heck, the whole garrison stuff from Second Front stems from two issues: keeping the local populace under control (which will have to be modelled in more detail in GE), and keeping some defenses in areas where there was a threat that the game doesn't include. Churchill was all for attacking in places Second Front doesn't include. You can't just let the Germans strip the place because the rules say it can't be invaded. > >>The hand of Dolph is never far away when looking at any > >>German move.... > > >While that's an accurate strategic assessment in its > >historical context, to say that the hand of Uncle Adolf is > >inflexible under any conditions buys more into the German > >General Staff apologists than it does help create a > >simulation. There are indeed certain activities that can be > >proscribed as being out of touch with the historical > >realities of who Hitler was [the German armed forces will > >NOT engage in a runaway defense!], but to state that he > >would have dictated the exact same activities by the same > >units [or types of units] under varying conditions ignores > >his actual, historical responses to situations that DID > >exist. > > Oh, I don't know. Uncle Dolph had a pretty limited > repetoire of reactions to events from winter 41 on. "Defend > to the last man", "Kill him", "Never give up", "Kill them" > seems to pretty much cover the essentials. You're missing a couple of important ones: "OK", and "Do that!" I'm not about to defend Hitler's ability as a strategist, but he did listen to generals he trusted and would order the abandonment of large territories (Western France and the Southern Balkans come to mind) when convinced it was necessary. Generals like Model had a pretty free hand. Weinberg, in _A_World_At_Arms_, has a very interesting theory about Hitler and the generals. He says that Hitler intended to win the war, whereas after '41 and much of '42 the generals were trying to lose gracefully. Hitler's decisions look much more rational when considering that. He wasn't interested in giving up Stalingrad, since if he couldn't hold it the war was likely lost. He wasn't interested in shortening the lines, since that would free Soviet, as well as German, forces, and it wasn't being presented as a way to regroup for an offensive. He wasn't interested in evacuating Army Group Courland, since by holding the Baltic coast he was preserving the Baltic as a training area for the new submarines that might defeat the Western Allies, enabling him to concentrate on the Soviet Union. The German generals were mostly interested in what was militarily feasible, and their instincts and experience told them that winning wasn't in the cards. Hitler made obvious errors (if his idea was to win in the near future, he had no business specifying objectives on economic, rather than military, criteria), and it is certainly arguable that his best chance was to drag the war on and hope to wear out the Allies, but Germany did not lose the war because of Hitler. David H. Thornley, known to the Wise as thornley@cs.umn.edu O- Disclaimer: These are not the opinions of the University of Minnesota, its Regents, faculty, staff, students, or squirrels. Datclaimer: Well, maybe the squirrels. They're pretty smart. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:04:09 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: SouthEast Front and Political Police [was Re: Second Front The deployment of 1st Panzer is an example of the Germans buying into supposed Allied plans to invade the Balkans with units based in Syria/Palestine/Iraq. The effects of the Allied intelligence operations are going to be very hard to model, and modelled they must be for Grand Europa!, and in some in some cases will straight-jacket players. The deployment of c/m units to far-flung theaters like Norway and Greece may well be one of these straight-jackets. Though I have no problem with any sort of generic combat factor/RE size requirements so long as they are sufficiently detailed to force historical garrisons in terms of security, c/m, mountain, etc. What players should be able to do is to override garrison requirements if and when necessary. Now all we need to do is to write such rules that allow for the release of 1st Panzer from Greece once, say Cyprus and Malta are Axis controlled, while keeping it there under most conditions. For example, Corsica was garrisoned after the Allied occupation by one Moroccan Goum of mountain troops, as well as other units, for the entire remainder of the war and I argued at the time that this should be reflected in the garrison requirments, but I was overruled. In this case the broken terrain and fractious population required the presence of a unit that could go anywhere on the island. This despite the utility of such a unit in the Alps or Vosges mountains. Also don't forget that the French really preferred non-white units to stay out of mainland France if possible as part of their blanchment process. If I must be categorized on this issue I think I could be called a believer in limited flexibility as nations did things during the war that are inexplicable in the strict military terms of a wargame, but make perfect sense if you look at them in the contexts of the time. I don't want to factor the out right stupidity of some bureaucrat in Whitehall or Berlin out of Europa. Garrison rules with Teeth, that what I want! Jason From: m.royer3@genie.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 03:25:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict Reply: Item #0437013 from PARDUE@HILDA.MAST.QUEENSU.CA@INET#on 96/02/24 at 16:35 on 24 Feb 96 Keith Pardue wrote: > Thanks for the amusing playtest report, Mark. So, what > do the political rules of this game look like? Also, what > is the map scale and how many maps are there? Is the > naval system more detailed than the Second Front system? Keith, Sorry, just found this among the myriad of messages. The Sino-Japanese Conflict (SJC) is essentially Europa in China. It uses standard Europa (Second Front) scales and system game mechanics. 16 mile hexes, 2 week turns, etc... The air and ground systems are virtually identical to SF. Supply is similar to FWTBT (i.e., attack supply). Since the naval war was secondary in China, the naval system is a pared down version of SF's system. Politics in SJC take the form of victory conditions, Chinese factional rules, and guerilla rules. Essentially the game boils down to one victory condition: cause the Nationalist government to collapse and the Japanese player wins, otherwise the Chinese player wins. Forcing the collapse is a combination of a number of factors such as military conquests, Chinese factional allegiance, number of active communist guerilla bases, etc... The Nationalist government's stability slowly erodes until it collapses. The Chinese army is divided into a bunch of factions, each having a cooperation level with the Nationalist government, which can change during the game. The communists are, of course, antagonistic. The plethora of warlord factions vary in cooperation and can even turn to Japanese puppets. Both the Chinese and Japanese player can vie for the loyalty of these armies through the expenditure of resource points (essentially bribes). Moreover, the Japanese player can set up a number of provincial, regional, and a national puppet government. These governments can raise more puppet units and their existance further erodes the stability of the Chinese Nationalist government. -Mark R. Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:31:19 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: Computers and Europa The German OB is bad when dealing with the units belonging to the divisions themselves. For example Panzer divisions had merged their motorcycle and recon battalions during the early part of '42. Some panzer divisions had 3 and others had only 1 panzer battalion, etc. Soviets ahd a number of similar problems, but I can't fault Atomic much as Sharp had yet to release any of his Soviet OB books when it was released. Also problems with weapons ranges. I know the AI is stupid. Conquering Stalingrad in 15 days was clear evidence of that. I just have a gut feeling, based on playing Gold-Juno-Sword and Stalingrad that there's a bias towards the offense when dealing with individual combats. Jason Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 23:35:05 -36000 From: Jason Long Subject: Re: occupation policies (fwd) I believe the most cited example was an area in AGC's sector where the Germans gave the civilians quotas of food and goods to produce and otherwise pretty much left things alone. Alexander Dallin's book on the German rule in occupied Russia should be illuminating on the topic. There's another, but I can't remember any details, Matthew Cooper perhaps? Jason From: j.broshot@genie.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 05:03:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Grand Europa etc. Here's my $0.02 about various postings: 1. 1st Panzer Division etc.: spent its "Balkan Interlude" mainly in Greece after refitting in France; as I recollect the Germans rotated burned out divisions through rear areas to refit and train replacements. I guess they figured a little combat experience in partisan warfare would help later. Panzer Lehr and other units went to Hungary in early 1944 to try and keep Hungary in the Axis camp. And speaking of the Balkans, Perry de Havilland wrote a very well reasoned short summary of the Balkan problems during WW2, to which I would like to note that the Germans raised, not one, but two SS divisions of Bosnia Muslims as well as assorted units of Croats and "ethnic" Germans. I am careful to note that most of these "volunteers" probably weren't. 2. Garrisons: don't forget that the British were forced to keep substantial forces in Palestine during the war (usually at least a division) because of what Churchill once termed, "the Anti-Zionist policies" of the prewar British governments. For Glory and Grand Europa the problem of the sizeable British garrison in India will have to be addressed. Many of the regular infantry battalions in India were not placed on war-footing until AFTER December 1941. Churchill demanded that the regulars be brought home at once and be replaced by Territorials (as was done in WW1) but that never happened (only 8 regular infantry battalions and 2 regular cavalry battalions were returned and 4 of those infantry units went back in 1942). Perhaps the Imperial General Staff was afraid of the influence of all those "Bolshies" in the ranks of the Territorials? 3. "What Ifs:" kudos to our man in New Zealand for the VERY complete review of the topic. There is also MAN IN A HIGH CASTLE by Phillip K. Dick and one about a mixed British and American force defending England against a 1942 Sea Lion (I regret that I failed to note the author and title) where the U. S. general in charge uses gas warfare as a final resort. There is always Harry Turtledove's series on the alien invasion of Earth during the height of World War 2, "Europa meets Mega-Traveller [or your favorite sci-fi battle game]!" One off beat what-if book for prehistoric Grand Europa postulated an invasion of New York by the Kaiser right after the Spanish-American War when the best U. S. troops were still overseas. The author was someone named Conroy and it was called 1904 or something like that. A footnote in a book about the Spanish-American War [AN ARMY FOR EMPIRE] mentions that Germans actually formulated plans along those lines! There is also HITLER THE VICTORY THAT NEARLY WAS by Bruce Quarrie which was given to me but which I have never read. It starts with the 7th Flieger Division taking out Malta in September 1941, Barbarossa starts in May 1942. 4. Gas Warfare; this will have to be addressed in Grand Europa-World War I style and perhaps for the really far out variants in Grand Europa- World War II. Hitler, of all people, was against it. The United States made extensive preparation for defensive and offensive gas warfare in WW2. Note all of those U.S. 1 x 1-8 Mortar IIs in SF. Those are 4.2inch chemical mortar battalions originally intended to fire gas shells, and found to be much more useful as regular artillery (and for their smoke shells and white phosporous). Jim Broshot, St. James MO From: Italorican@aol.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 00:37:11 -0500 n the political economy of the Third Reich and of the continuities. A while back, someone mentioned GM and the Ruhr -- Income was being banked for GM German subsidiaries all throughout the war. As for Mussolini and Italy and posturing and whatnot. John Astell's comment concerning Graziani and the Lybian popular insurgency is very appropriate. I would expect that europa-ists might be more sophisticated about Italy as a belligerant -- and not echo some of the wop-bashing typifications that graced and still grace the pages of a lot of Anglo-American and German writing about that war. I was disabused of this kind of belittling italian soldiery long ago, sometime in the late 70s when I read a memoir by an Italian officer -- who later fought with the partisans and ended up in charge of the italian graves registration/repatriation commission in North Africa. Unfortunately, I cannot give you the reference at this moment. As for Fascism and the U.S., look at David F. Schmitz's study of "The US and Fascist Italy, 1922-1940. Very nice study of US support for a strongman regime, to restore normalcy. Including very large loans and direct investment. Antonio Lauria From: grd1@genie.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 15:15:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Who is the player RE: What does the player represent Obviously the player does not represent a sinlge individual or even a single level in the chain of command. EUROPA is not a role playing game by any means. If anyone assumed that was what I intended they ASS-U-MEd wrong. The players represent (in my opinion anyway) the Corps-Army-Army Group and sometimes Theater commanders and their air counterparts [in regular EUROPA games]. They do not represent the heads of state, or service chiefs. The Joint or Combined Staffs were making decisions that the Theater Commanders would have to comply with (i.e. whether or not to invade N. Africa, transfer troops out of theater, switch production from bombers to fighters, etc). Only in SF does the player get to make some of the higher level decisions such as when and where to invade Italy/France. In GE the players will need more freedom than has been allowed in the individual (Campaign) games. The questions is how much freedom? If we assume (a dangerous thing sometimes) that the players represent the heads of state then ANYTHING sould resonable be allowed. With 20-20 hindsight a German player (lets call him Adolf) would want to do some or all of the following: 1. Develop the A-bomb 2. Develop ground to air missiles 3. Speed development of the ME262 4. Change his war strategy to avoid a 2 front war: take Britain's Empire out of the war (I assume Sea Lion to be next to immpossible) by taking Gibralter, Malta, N. Africa and the Middle East. 5. Only after the British Empire has been reduced to a shadow of it's former self would Russia be attacked. Even if we remove the first three from consideration this will make an interesting game. Of course this ability can go against Adolf when we give it to the French. Being the student of history that most EUROPA players are, a French player would realize France is going to fall, and: 1. Evacuate to North Africa and England as many forces as possible. This would include the entire French Navy and major air and ground forces. 2. Invade and take Italian N Africa. 3. Wait for help to regain France. The advantages of this strategy are: 1. Almost 100% certainty that N Africa and England will be saved from the axis. 2. An overwhelming allied naval superiority. 3. Lots of extra allied forces close to axis weak points. 4. Makes the axis tie down large forces in Italy/Sicily/France/Norway guarding against a very early allied invasion. Certainly the allies will have a huge force to land in Greece or elsewhere and enough to hold Crete for as long as they want. (Crete is an excellent place from which to bomb the Balkans, ie Ploesti.) Give players the ability to make Stalin's decisions and they are going to: 1. Deploy their frontier forces in a very sensible fortified defense in depth with their armor well protected. 2. Take all of Finland as soon as possible. 3. Bide their time until they are ready to attack. #1 seems the very least we should allow, and that alone will make a German invasion much less likely to succeed. Now I must ask those people who want to give players full control of their national economies and armed forces if the result would be anything like a "simulation" of WWII? Or, would it be a political-military "game" using WWII as a model. Perhaps we will end up with both, at different stages of development. I can get enjoyment out of either, but much prefer the simulation to the game. Alan Tibbetts From: grd1@genie.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 15:16:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Alternate History Jim Broshot RE: Alternate History One very nice alternate history was "The Red Napoleon" which postulated an assasination of Stalin followed by a military coup. The Soviets then marched west. A Bolshie British Admiral kept his fleet in port when the Reds crossed the channel. Then a combined Soviet-Japanese invasion of the Americas. After the Soviet invasion of Maine-New Brunswick the major battle was fought along the Hudson River/Erie canal. After a decisive US victory over the combined Brit-Italina-Russian-German- Japanese fleet in the carribean (the US had 1000 seaplanes which helped), and a revolt in Europe, the Soviet dictator was captured. Also, "The Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33" by Hector Bywater. A very accurate piece of fiction written in the 1920s. The Japanese initiate the war with a surpise attack on US Pacific bases while negotiations are still in progress and attempt to establish an invulnerable defensive web in the western Pacific. Yammamoto and Bywater actual met and discussed Pacific war strategy. Alan Tibbetts Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 12:05:43 -0500 From: Nicholas Forte Subject: Re: Grand Europa On Fri, 15 Mar 96 01:27:00 UTC 0000 grd1@genie.com wrote: >RE: Will France fall? > > >YES, given anything but totally incompetent German play, France will fall. > >However, there remains much to be decided. How quickly? How much of the BEF >got away? How many Germans died to gain the victory (how dearly did the >French sell themselves)? Did Germany also invade the low countries? Or >Switzerland? > >To find the answers the campaign does need to be fought. > >Alan Tibbetts I must disagree with your position that France will fall except for totally incompetent German play. The historical case was one of totally incompetent French play. General Gamelin's decisions in deploying the French Army invited the blitzkrieg that fell upon it. The half dozen divisions guarding the Ardennes sector were the worse in the French Army, being mostly class "B" divisions made up of older reservists and missing about half of their artillery equipment. In addition, they were assigned to hold frontages that were twice that called for in French doctrine. Marshal Petain's statement about the Ardennes being impenetrable carried with a qualifier "provided we make some special dispositions." Gamelin made NO special dispositions, essentially ignoring the front. At the same time, approximately 50 higher quality divisions were sitting uselessly in the Maginot Line. The assignment of so many divisions to the Maginot Line is all the more disgraceful when it is realized that their average frontage was half that of the Ardennes divisions, despite being the most heavily fortified region in Europe! This folly of overmanning an area that should have been used for an economy of force left Gamelin with too few divisions to properly man the rest of the front or to establish a proper reserve. The importance of a strong reserve for French doctrine was important since, despite the common misperception, the French never considered the continuous front to be impenetrable. The purpose of the continous front was to slow down any enemy attack long enough for the general staff to rush reserves to the sector an contain any breakout. Gamelin's failure to establish such a reserve was therefore against French doctrine. Gamelin magnified this mistake when, at the last minute, he assigned 6 divisions from his limited General Reserve to the 7th Army with the mission of linking up with the Dutch Army at Breda. This despite the fact that the 7th Army needed to march twice as far as the German 18th Army to reach Breda. Thus, when the breakthrough (which he practically invited) at Sedan came, Gamelin had no forces with which to contain it. The Germans were then able to exploit this breakthrough and drive to the Channel. A more reasoned French deployment would have made it more difficult for the Germans to cross the Meuse and even if the crossing were accomplished, would have given the French the troops to contain it. Some might object that the French doctrine was ill-suited to fight a defensive battle against an armor assault. However, the French were able to adapt fairly quickly to fighting armor after Dunkerque when they abandoned the linear defence and adopted the "checkerboard defense" of separated hedgehog posistions at the Weygand Line. The downfall of the Weygand Line was not due to doctrine, but rather the lack of troops to carry it out as the French Army had lost a third of its forces at Dunkerque. In fact, the 'checkerboard' defense was not a new creation of General Weygand, but already existed in French doctrine. It was to be used, however, only when armor attacks were expected and was thus considered an exception to the more widely used linear defense. Nonetheless, if the French were able to slow down the Germans on the Meuse, it is almost certain that the French Army would have had the time to recognize that armor attacks had progressed from the tactical scale and were now a strategic instrument. This would have lead to the 'checkerboard' to become the standard French defense, in place of the linear defense. It has generally be argued that even if the French Army was better deployed than historically, it would have been ground down in an attrition battle with the larger German Army. However, I will argue that despite the common wisdom, time was not on the side of Germany. For one, Germany had failed to take advantage of its industrial advantages over France. While German production was geared to both a "guns" and "butter" economy, the French were quickly moving over to a total wartime production. For example, between September 1939 and May 1940, the French produced 2.5 times as many tanks as did Germany. This ratio held even when considering the heavier tanks of the time (ie. Char B1bis and PzIV). French wartime production plans called for the building of about twice as many tanks in 1940 than Germany actually produced at the time. It is true that Germany could have produced more tanks if it also fully mobilized its economy, but such a move would have been a political defeat for the Nazi regime which had promised the German people that it could go to war without causing economic hardship on the homefront. Combined with the spector of a repeat of the stagnated fronts and attrition battles of WWI, it is questionable if the Nazi regime could have survived. The situation in the air is no better for Germany. The combined French and British aero industries would have outbuilt the German industry if the Battle of France continued beyond June 1940. It is true that the French industry was plagued with problems in the winter of 39-40, but this was due primarily from the rapid mobilization of the industry from very low peacetime production rates to wartime levels. By the spring of 1940, most of these problems had been worked out and French production levels were on target, producing modern aircraft, such as the D.520 fightes and Leo.451 bomber, which were the match to anything the Luftwaffe could through at them. In fact, the Armee de l'Air was larger on June 22 at the end of the campaign than it was on May 4 at the beginning. By the fall of 1940, it is likely that the Luftwaffe would have lost air supremacy to the Allies. The only weakpoint in the French ability to survive a long campaign was its manpower shortage. With half of the population of Germany, France was in no condition to match, man-for-man, the replacements available to Germany. However, to the French manpower pool must be added that of Britain. The British had promised the French that 30 British divisions would be in France by the spring of 1941. Also, it is questionable if Germany could have thrown the full weight of it manpower advantage at the French. During the short campaign of 1940, the Germans could afford to post only a handful of division on their eastern front to watch the Red Army. However, if the German Army got bogged down in France, Hitler and the general staff would have to look increasingly with concern over their shoulders to the east. Even if Stalin would not have considered intervening in the war, Hitler could not be certain. Prudence would have caused Germany to syphon off a considerable number of troops to guard the eastern frontier. In all, the fall for France was far from being pre-ordained. Some better moves by Gamelin and a few poorer ones by the Germans could have led to a stalemate in the West. Nick Forte Reston, VA Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 18:38:51 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: The Fall of France (to be or not to be) Nick Forte wrote re. the contention France was always doomed to fall: >I must disagree with your position that France will fall except for totally >incompetent German play. The historical case was one of totally incompetent >French play. General Gamelin's decisions in deploying the French Army invited >the blitzkrieg that fell upon it. Hear, hear! >The half dozen divisions guarding the Ardennes sector were the worse in the >French Army, being mostly class "B" divisions made up of older reservists and >missing about half of their artillery equipment. In addition, they were >assigned to hold frontages that were twice that called for in French doctrine. >Marshal Petain's statement about the Ardennes being impenetrable carried with a >qualifier "provided we make some special dispositions." Gamelin made NO >>special dispositions, essentially ignoring the front. > >At the same time, approximately 50 higher quality divisions were sitting >uselessly in the Maginot Line. The assignment of so many divisions to the >Maginot Line is all the more disgraceful when it is realized that their average >frontage was half that of the Ardennes divisions, despite being the most >heavily fortified region in Europe! snip >Thus, when the breakthrough (which he practically invited) at Sedan came, >Gamelin had no forces with which to contain it. The Germans were then able to >exploit this breakthrough and drive to the Channel. A more reasoned French >deployment would have made it more difficult for the Germans to cross the Meuse >and even if the crossing were accomplished, would have given the French the >troops to contain it. snip >It has generally be argued that even if the French Army was better >deployed >than historically, it would have been ground down in an >attrition battle w. the >larger German Army. However, I will argue that despite the common wisdom, time >was not on the side of Germany. For one, Germany had failed to take advantage >of its industrial advantages over France. While German production was geared >to both a "guns" and "butter" economy, the French were quickly moving over to a >total wartime production. For example, between September 1939 and May 1940, >the French produced 2.5 x as many tanks as did Germany. This ratio held even >when considering the heavier tanks of the time (ie. Char B1bis and PzIV). >French wartime production plans called for the building of about twice as many >tanks in 1940 than Germany actually produced at the time. Yes. French automotive production was awesome! >It is true that >Germany could have produced more tanks if it also fully mobilized its economy, >but such a move would have been a political defeat for the Nazi regime which >had promised the German people that it could go to war without causing economic >hardship on the homefront. Combined with the spector of a repeat of the >stagnated fronts and attrition battles of WWI, it is questionable if the Nazi >regime could have survived. Hmm. > >The situation in the air is no better for Germany. Worse. MUCH worse, in fact. In this respect, the effects of the much higher rate of Allied air production would have made itself felt much faster than tank or truck production. Deprived of its tactical air support in 1941 by clouds of D.520s and Spitfires, the Luftwaffe would probably have found itself concentrating not on supporting the Wehrmacht, but trying to prevent the RAF/Adel'A bombing the hell out of German industry if the front line was still pinned on the Maginot. Really, things start to get pretty dicey for the Luftwaffe as early as Nov/Dec 1940 if France is still in the game. >The combined French and >British aero industries would have outbuilt German industry if the Battle of >France continued beyond June 1940. It is true that the French industry was >plagued with problems in the winter of 39-40, but this was due primarily from >the rapid mobilization of the industry from very low peacetime production rates >to wartime levels. By the spring of 1940, most of these problems had been >worked out and French production levels were on target, producing modern >aircraft, such as the D.520 fightes and Leo.451 bomber, which were the match to >anything the Luftwaffe could through at them. Basically I agree although I do not entirely agree that the D.520 was quite as good as a Bf-109E. It was certainly good enough that you could come up and fight (one could say the same about the Hurricane) and it had the legs to escort bombers to the Ruhr in 1941 (by which time a new and much tastier generation of French fighter would has started appearing in good numbers and have eroded any German technical edge down to nothing). Also, the Leo.451 was a very fine bomber. >In fact, the Armee de l'Air was >larger on June 22 at the end of the campaign than it was on May 4 at the >beginning. By the fall of 1940, it is likely that the Luftwaffe would >have >lost air supremacy to the Allies. Pretty much guaranteed to loose it, I would say. Anglo-French aero production was simply too great for any other outcome. >The only weakpoint in the French ability to survive a long campaign was its >manpower shortage. With half of the population of Germany, France was in no >condition to match, man-for-man, the replacements available to Germany. >However, to the French manpower pool must be added that of Britain. The >British had promised the French that 30 British divisions would be in >France by >the spring of 1941. Also, it is questionable if Germany could have thrown the >full weight of it manpower advantage at the French. During the short campaign >of 1940, the Germans could afford to post only a handful of division on their >eastern front to watch the Red Army. However, if the German Army got bogged >down in France, Hitler and the general staff would have to look increasingly >with concern over their shoulders to the east. Even if Stalin would not have >considered intervening in the war, Hitler could not be certain. Prudence would >have caused Germany to syphon off a considerable number of troops to guard the >eastern frontier. > >In all, the fall for France was far from being pre-ordained. Some better moves >by Gamelin and a few poorer ones by the Germans could have led to a stalemate >in the West. > I am less sanguine about the Nazi regime collapsing if France hangs in there, but basically, Nick, I think you are absolutely right (but then you knew that, didn't you). Playing FoF seems to support this (France often survives. German player often uses the Switzerland option to break the stalemate (a sure sign of desperation)). Vive la France! Perry ...- From: Italorican@aol.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 1996 17:58:12 -0500 Subject: Re: Alternative history There is a book-length study of alternative military histories and futures by I.F. Clarke ("Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars 1763-3749", Oxford University Press, 1992). Antonio Lauria From: grd1@genie.com Date: Sat, 16 Mar 96 22:26:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Stacking Pardon me if this return post is a little late. This is the 4th attempt to send it to the listserver from GEnie. RE: Stacking Limits Have any of the people pushing higher stacking limits tried them in a variety of EUROPA games? A 5-5-3 or 6-6-3 stacking limit is going to have major effects on places like Leningarad, Tobruk and the entire Maginot line. I would like to hear comments on games played with increased stacking rules. By solving the problem of "impossible attack stacking" in this manner we will have created another problem of "the impossible defense". Perhaps it is time to consider ways to use Corps markers or a limited number of special "Breakthru" attack markers for increased stacking. For example, allow each side to use 2 Corps markers (or Breaktrhu markers) per Theater with 6-6-3 stacking. Unlimited use of increased stacking is going to create more problems than it solves. RE: The certain fall of France Although the French should have been able to give a better account of themselves the conventional wisdom is almost certainly correct (ie German had a significant manpower advantage and could afford to take losses in an attritional war of limited duration). What is even more important, in terms of EUROPA and the 1940 campaign, is that the Germans made better use of the resources they had. They had less tanks than the French & Brits, but used them much more effectively. German divisions are, on the average, more powerful, and thus they can mass more combat power in the same space (ie hex). Sure the Brits and French could have matched the Germans, given enough time. But they didn't have enough time. As you point out (and I agree), they needed until late 1940 to approach an even footing. No German player is going sit by and wait for that to happen. Most likely, German players are going to attack sooner than the historical campaign, even if that is in January 1940. Dispite the weather a January attack has major advantages for the Germans, particularly in finding the Allies in even worse shape and providing more time to whittle down the french army. If the Maginot line is seriously weakened to help other sections of the front the Germans WILL be able to pierce it. As I've said before, avoiding a declaration of war on the Low Countries has advantages for the Germans. Although you pointed out one weak point in the French position there is another. They have very little strategic depth (in their home country that is). They can't afford a defense in depth, and therefore can't trade space for time. Given that the Germans will pick the place and time of attack this is a serious situation. Coupled with an unfavorable correlation of forces the French are doomed. Although I've seen the Germans get a black eye, I've never seen them lose a game of FoF, and I've never seen them invade Switzerland. Alan Tibbetts Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 00:56:16 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: Stacking & France >RE: Stacking Limits > >Have any of the people pushing higher stacking limits tried them in a > variety of EUROPA games? A 5-5-3 or 6-6-3 stacking limit is going to have > major effects on places like Leningarad, Tobruk and the entire Maginot line. > I would like to hear comments on games played with increased stacking > rules. For an interesting analysis on the effects of dispersal (or lack thereof) on casualty rates, read *Numbers, Prediction & War* by T.N. Dupuy, Hero Books, 1985. The implications for Europa are clear: more stacking = more combat power BUT also more casualties for the overstacked hex. It makes sense if you think about it. There is much merit to altering the rules re.stacking to enable historic situations to be simulated. However, the rule must be draughted with care or it will shoot carefully constructed scenarios out of whack. Packing artillery in wheel to wheel means a much greater vulnerability to counter-battery fire etc. etc. >RE: The certain fall of France > >Although the French should have been able to give a better account of >themselves the conventional wisdom is almost certainly correct (ie German >had a significant manpower advantage and could afford to take losses in an >attritional war of limited duration). What is even more important, in terms >of EUROPA and the 1940 campaign, is that the Germans made better use of the >resources they had. They had less tanks than the French & Brits, but used >them much more effectively. German divisions are, on the average, more >powerful, and thus they can mass more combat power in the same space (ie >hex). > >Sure the Brits and French could have matched the Germans, given enough time. >But they didn't have enough time. As you point out (and I agree), they >needed until late 1940 to approach an even footing. No German player is >going sit by and wait for that to happen. Most likely, German players are >going to attack sooner than the historical campaign, even if that is in >January 1940. Dispite the weather a January attack has major advantages for >the Germans, particularly in finding the Allies in even worse shape and >providing more time to whittle down the french army. I have done this early attack strategy as the German and also defended against this as the French/Brits. Sometimes it works and sometimes it ends in tears. The BIG disadvantage is that it wastes the best value of the idiot rules during poor weather, negating the really devastating blitzkrieg effects and forcing an attritional approach that might make sense in a game of FoF but is CRAZY in Grand Europa campaign. >If the Maginot line is seriously weakened to help other sections of the >front the Germans WILL be able to pierce it. As I've said before, avoiding >a declaration of war on the Low Countries has advantages for the Germans. If defended correctly, piercing the Maginot gets you nowhere. The French never felt it would be impossible to break Maginot, so they devised a sound strategy for cordoning off any attacks. Sure, you can do it, just don't expect to got anywhere fast against a good French player. >Although you pointed out one weak point in the French position there is >another. They have very little strategic depth (in their home country that >is). They can't afford a defense in depth, and therefore can't trade space >for time. Given that the Germans will pick the place and time of attack >this is a serious situation. Coupled with an unfavorable correlation of >forces the French are doomed. Yes and no. If the French do not make the mistake of being lured into Belgium and handle the deployments better than they did historically, you would be surprise how nasty it can get for the Germans. Even when playing with the historical set up, if the French do not fold up pretty much exactly according to the historical time table (a few unlucky attack rolls for the Wehrmacht is all it takes), I have found the historical breakthroughs just do not happen. It is a finer balance than you think. The French are almost always played better than historic: in order to win, therefore, the German player has very little room for mistakes. If the German makes the mistake of not attacking Belgium, the French position is even happier and the units that historically committed suicide courtesy of Gamelin instead make up a nice mobile reserve of meaty units. >Although I've seen the Germans get a black eye, I've never seen them lose a >game of FoF, and I've never seen them invade Switzerland. In my experience, the Huns win about 60% of the time. The fact I have occasionally kicked the arse of *good* German players in FoF is why one of them tried a Switzerland strategy. It worked. I had him stopped cold and poor weather was getting nearer and nearer. So he crashed into lowland Switzerland, using a cordon of junk units to keep the Swiss off this supply lines, and turned my flank with a panzer corps :-( It was very well executed and I did not see it coming. He was into France via Switzerland (with at least one or two units) within the first turn. It still took him a lot longer than historical but I could not re-stabilise the front after that. Regards Perry ...- From: m.royer3@genie.com Date: Sun, 17 Mar 96 03:43:00 UTC 0000 Subject: Sino-Japanese Conflict Playtes Oct I 37 Japanese Player Turn Despite the onset of frost throughout northern China and Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Kwantung army continues its persuit of retreating Chinese provincial units by thrusting to the west into the province of Shansi. Spearheaded by the now fully assembled Senda Mechanized Division, the Japanese strike force of Senda, two brigades, and a multitude of supporting units, overrun several provincial divisions in their push to the inner Great Wall. Continuing the southward strike from northern Hopei, the Japanese Army follows the two main rail lines. On the eastern Tsinpu Railway, advance units strike into Shantung province using massed tankette tactics. Moving essentially unopposed, the tankette units drive as far as the Hwang Ho (Yellow River) where they pause to allow infantry of the 10th, 14th, and 101st divisions to catch up. Meanwhile, onthe more western Pinghan Railway, which runs along the north-south axis of the Hopei Province, the Japanese, led by the 5th, 6th, and 13th divisions, advance towards the partial hex city of Shihkiachuang. In Central China, the slugfest at Shanghai continues. In bloody street fighting, the Japanese capture the fourth of seven city hexes. Anchored by the 3rd, 11th, 108th, and 109th divisions, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force faces 12 Chinese divisions in the city and manymore in the suburbs. Chinese resistance is stiff and consists of the creme-de-la-creme of the Nationalists Central Army. However, with the banks of the Whangpoo River now secure all the way into the International Concession, the Japanese supply situation in Central China has eased. Following bloody air battles in the opening moves of the conflict, both air forces have tended to shy away from direct combat, opting instead for targets beyond the opposing fighter coverage. Oct I 37 Chinese Player Turn Continuing their run-away defense in Hopei Province, the Chinese retreat to the Liaochang River and begin to set up a defensive line in the far southern extreme of the province. Meanwhile, a strong rear guard holding force, which includes a Central Army division and artillery, is left behind in Shihkiachuang, in hopes of slowing the oncoming Japanese at this strategic crossroads. In Shantung, reinforcements are railed northward towards the provincial capitol of Tsinan, despite objections from the uncooperative warlord-governor Han Fu-chu. Han, long suspected of collaboration with the Japanese, is losing grip of his own forces. Two division defect from Hans army and join Central Army units in setting up guerilla operations in the mountains of central Shantung. In Shansi province, the 115th Communist division evaporates in the face of advance elements of the Senda Mechanized division. The communistsrecede into the foothills of the Wutai Shan mountain range and begin to setup a base of guerilla operations. Yen Hsi-shan, warlord-governor of Shansi critizes the Chinese united front, whereby the nationalists and communists have joined in common cause against the Japanese, exclaiming that the Chinese Army should never again depend on communist units to defend critical junctures. The road from Pingsingkwan to Taiyuan, the Shansi capitol, is now free of Chinese defenders and open to direct assault from Senda. In Shanghai, the Chinese try to balance the best defensive posture, while attempting to avoid huge losses of their valuable (and nearly irreplacable) supported and self-supported units. -Mark R. Date: 17 Mar 96 07:15:12 EST From: Jim Arnold <74133.1765@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: Stacking My proposal was 4-4-3 stacking, so I'll confine myself to that. > the rule must be draughted with care or it will shoot carefully constructed > scenarios out of whack. I don't actually see that much fidelity to history in the scenarios I've played. Have you ever seen the Germans reach the coast at Abbeville in one turn (and in strength), even with idiot rules? Poland, France, Africa, Norway - all could benefit from a more powerful attacker early in the war. When offensives later become more prolonged, it's not excessive stacking but an absense of logistical contraints that throw the balance. Perry, I agree that economic issues are relevent to the Europa list, insofar as they impact the political and military models for GE. For the benefit of those who think that GE can work without complex political mechanisms, I'd like to see a contrast between your view and Steve's on how the political-economic repercussions of a specific event in GE should be handled. The attitude of the Allies toward a prospective fall of France, and their reactions, might be a good example For those who don't care to read about economic theory, the rest of this post can be avoided: > The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various > goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how > capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed > to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal) > property rights. What are the market forces that prevent the concentration of capital into fewer and fewer hands? What are the market forces that prevent those who gain significant economic power from using the state "to achieve various goals in accordance with some set of [private if not nationalist] views"? How, in other words, would a "free market" avoid its own destruction? Where has there ever been a "free market", and what became of it? Frankly, I don't find the free-market ideology to be very sophisticated. I see it as more of a "myth" or a "spin" designed to further the interests of those who have the upper hand in the market. I really believe that if the US continues down the "free market" road, while the Asian nations in particular maintain concerted efforts to protect their economies, we're going to fall so far behind we'll never catch up. Jim Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 16:05:08 +0100 From: cloister@dircon.co.uk (Perry de Havilland) Subject: Re: Stacking & Politics Jim Arnold wrote re. my earlier posts: >My proposal was 4-4-3 stacking, so I'll confine myself to that. > >> the rule must be draughted with care or it will shoot carefully constructed >> scenarios out of whack. > >I don't actually see that much fidelity to history in the scenarios I've >played. >Have you ever seen the Germans reach the coast at Abbeville in one turn (and in >strength), even with idiot rules? Poland, France, Africa, Norway - all could >benefit from a more powerful attacker early in the war. When offensives later >become more prolonged, it's not excessive stacking but an absense of logistical >contraints that throw the balance. The way to measure 'fidelity to history' is not how your particular battle of FoF (or whatever) pans out, but rather: can you simulate what happened in a 'lets-not-play-the-game' but rather let us recreate each turn as it happened historically, calculate what the attacks would have been and then look at the CRT each time and decide 'OK, it is a 2:1. The historical result was clearly a DE, so something is wrong here'. Of course, this is somewhat subjective (but only somewhat) and a bit imprecise. Nevertheless, I think THAT is the only way to measure how much 'fidelity to history' a game is capable of rendering. If it fails badly, then the rules/counter values/dispositions/whatever are wrong and need to be looked at again. If it is pretty much on the money, then fine. Whilst the Europa system is not perfect (and what is?), it is a bloody good system in my opinion and it gets better every year. That said, I completely agree with your remarks re-logistics. Stacking level of 4-4-3? Okay, but why put that particular limit. Do you have a historical example in mind (perhaps you do)? How about a more open ended limit, with escalating casualty implications as dispersal diminishes. Just an idea. >I agree that economic issues are relevent to the Europa list, insofar as they >impact the political and military models for GE. For the benefit of those who >think that GE can work without complex political mechanisms, I'd like to see a >contrast between your view and Steve's on how the political-economic >repercussions of a specific event in GE should be handled. The attitude of the >Allies toward a prospective fall of France, and their reactions, might be a >good example Sounds interesting. >For those who don't care to read about economic theory, the rest of this post >can be avoided: > >> The essence of a fascist economy is state intervention to achieve various >> goals in accordance with some set of nationalist views. The essence of how >> capitalist an economy is is the extent to which market forces are allowed >> to function within a legal structure that secures several (i.e. personal) >> property rights. > >What are the market forces that prevent the concentration of capital into fewer >and fewer hands? What are the market forces that prevent those who gain >significant economic power from using the state "to achieve various goals in >accordance with some set of [private if not nationalist] views"? How, in other >words, would a "free market" avoid its own destruction? Where has there ever >been a "free market", and what became of it? > >Frankly, I don't find the free-market ideology to be very sophisticated. I see >it as more of a "myth" or a "spin" designed to further the interests of those >who have the upper hand in the market. I really believe that if the US >continues >down the "free market" road, while the Asian nations in particular maintain >concerted efforts to protect their economies, we're going to fall so far behind >we'll never catch up. > Not surprisingly, I disagree not only with your points (all of them, in fact, and quite profoundly) but also on the premise on which you make them (i.e. the point to which I was actually referring in the post to which you are replying). However, I do not feel this particular discussion is germane to Europa in any shape or form, so I will send you my reply to this via a direct e-mail. No point in inflicting our political opinions on the rest of the on-line Europa community unless it is relevant to the game in some way. Regards Perry ...-